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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: you are counsel for a day care
center, and you are researching whether or not a child with diabetes qualifies as
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' Assume summary
judgment had already been granted in favor of the child and you are now
appealing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. During your
research you come across a Ninth Circuit case directly on point.2 In the case,
the court held a plaintiff with diabetes who required only moderate changes and
restrictions in his diet was not substantially impaired in his ability to eat, and
thus did not qualify as disabled under the ADA.3 This is the exact argument
you want to make, but there is a problem. Instead of saying "Opinion" the
document says "Memorandum," and has the following disclaimer: "[t]his dis-
position is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the
courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3."'
Uncertain as to how this would affect your intended use, you look up
Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, which provides:
(a) Not Precedent: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not binding
precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel.
(b) Citation: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be cited to or
by the courts of this circuit, except in the following circumstances.
(i) They may be cited to this Court or to or by any other court in this circuit when
relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(ii) They may be cited to this Court or by any other courts in this circuit for factual
purposes, such as to show double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, notice, entitlement
to attorneys' fees, or the existence of a related case.
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to express gratitude to Professor Tuan Samahon for his guidance throughout
the writing of this note, and to my wife, Jessica, for always being there for me.
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2004).
2 Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 23 F. App'x 811 (9th Cir. 2001).
3 Id. at 812.
4 Id.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
(iii) They may be cited to this Court in a request to publish a disposition or order
made pursuant to Circuit Rule 36-4, or in a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing
en banc, in order to demonstrate the existence of a conflict among opinions, disposi-
tions, or orders.
(c) Attach Copy: A copy of any cited unpublished disposition or order must be
attached to the document in which it is cited, as an appendix.
5
Although the rule seems to bar citation as precedent, you wonder, if at the
very least, you could cite it as persuasive authority. After all, why would the
court ban all mention of a case decided by the same court when it addressed the
same issue and only had done so in this one opinion? Surprisingly, citing the
unpublished opinion even for this limited purpose can result in substantial
sanctions.
Recently, limited citation rules such as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 have
attracted much attention and criticism. 6 A proposed rule from the Judicial Con-
ference, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which will make all unpub-
lished opinions issued after January 1, 2007, citable in all appeals courts, 7 seeks
to bring an end to these limited citation rules. Section II of this note will
review the arguments for and against limited citation rules including a detailed
look at limited citation rules in the context of precedent. This section will
emphasize the Ninth Circuit's heavy reliance on the use of unpublished opin-
ions and limited citation rules given the Circuit's overwhelming workload.
Section III will provide a brief background to the rule-making process and dis-
cuss the current status of Rule 32.1. Section IV will then address the potential
consequences Rule 32.1 will create for the Ninth Circuit, such as trial courts
giving too much weight to unpublished decisions. Additionally, the increased
time in preparing unpublished decisions may lead to a decreased quality of
published opinions. Also, this will create confusion for attorneys who are faced
with inconsistencies between federal and state procedure. Finally, Section V
will address potential solutions to these consequences, such as splitting the
Ninth Circuit into smaller circuits, adding more judges to the Ninth Circuit
bench, and limiting appeals as of right.
II. THE HISTORY OF LIMITED CITATION RULES
A. Arguments for the Use of Limited Citation Rules
1. Massive Caseloads Threaten Quality of Work
Some judges and scholars have defended the use of unpublished opinions
on grounds of judicial economy, indicating that because the size,8 and number
of appeals filed have increased at a rate faster than the appellate courts, the
S9TH CIR. R. App. P. 36-3.
6 See infra Section II.B.
7 See FED. R. App. P. 32.1 (effective Dec. 1, 2006).
8 Hon. Boyce Martin, In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 177, 182-83
(1999) ("The size of the appeals, in terms of documents submitted to the court, also has
grown. My evidence here is based on personal experience, but I think most judges would
agree with me on this point. More briefs are pushing the fifty-page limit, and the joint
appendices are coming in by the box-load. It is all I can do to lift these appendices, let alone
read them.").
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courts have had to resort to methods of dealing with cases in a more expedi-
tious manner.9 Thus, the use of limited publication and citation rules can be
viewed as an administrative measure adopted by the appellate courts in
response to "dramatic caseload increases in the late 1960s and early 1970s. ' 'I °
These rules, originally urged by the United States Judicial Conference in
1972," were developed and adopted by each of the individual circuits as an
effort to help with caseload management. 2
Judges have continued to argue that the use of unpublished opinions yields
numerous advantages including: preserving limited judicial resources; 3
allowing the court to exclude a recitation of the facts and "ponderous discus-
sions of the law," which in turn allows the opinion to be shorter;14 relieving
judges from having to worry about precise wording that may bind them in
future cases due to the unpublished opinion's lack of precedential effect; 5 and
saving judges and parties time by limiting the number of "essentially identical
cases" that must be researched. 6 Because unpublished opinions tend to be
shorter than published opinions,' 7 the judicial effort needed per unpublished
opinion is substantially lower and allows the court to better keep up with its
caseload. One study found that although "the number of published opinions
per judge remained roughly unchanged between 1960 and 1995, the number of
cases decided per judge more than quadrupled in the same period."' 8 This is
due in large part to the increased use of unpublished opinions.
The use of unpublished opinions has become especially popular in the
Ninth Circuit due to its massive caseload.' 9 Despite having close to fifty
judgeships by the end of 2004, the court has continued to struggle with the
9 David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in
the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 821 (2005). But cf. Jessie Allen, Just Words?
The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555, 563
(2005) (criticizing the adoption of limited publication as a method to deal with increased
caseloads without considering alternative methods such as increasing the size of the
judiciary).
10 J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of the "Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox
of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 SETON HALL Cm. REV. 27, 37
(2005).
'' Id.
12 Id. at 37-38.
13 Hon. J. Clifford Wallace, Essay: Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through
Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187, 203 (2005) (arguing that
between September 2002 and September 2003 the Ninth Circuit only issued published opin-
ions in fifteen percent of its cases, but that "[b]y disposing of the other eighty-five percent
expeditiously in 'memorandum dispositions,' the court ensured that the precedential opin-
ions received the time and craftsmanship they deserved").
'" Id. at 202 (arguing that "[tihe court drafts the disposition for the benefit of the trial court
and the parties, all of whom are already familiar with the case's factual background and legal
issues").
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Law, supra note 9, at 821 (indicating that many unpublished opinions rarely exceed two
sentences in length and "in some circuits, the median length of an unpublished opinion is
fewer than fifty words").
18 Id.
19 Wallace, supra note 13, at 203.
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demands of its caseload.2 ° According to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, the total number of appeals commenced or pending in the
Ninth Circuit between April 1, 2004, and March 31, 2005, equaled twenty-four
percent of the total number of such federal intermediary appeals filed nation-
wide, and forty-five percent more than the circuit with the next largest
caseload.2 1 Thus, Ninth Circuit judges have been forced to resort to the use of
unpublished opinions to control their caseload, much like the Supreme Court
uses discretionary review to control its caseload.2 2
Some have argued that Rule 32.1 will eliminate these advantages because,
since "the precedential effect of an opinion turns on the exposition of the rele-
vant facts .. .and the precise phrasing of propositions of law,"23 judges will
have to spend more time ensuring that the language used is precise and safe
from distortion in future cases.24 This will not only eliminate the resources
saved by using unpublished opinions, but it will also decrease the quality of
published opinions by leaving the judges with less time to work on them.25
2. Unpublished Opinions Are Generally Written by Law Clerks
Supporters of limited citation rules often argue the sheer size of the
caseloads appellate courts carry makes limited citation rules necessary. 26 Due
to time constraints and caseload pressures, appellate court judges have had to
dramatically increase their reliance on judicial staff and law clerks.2 7 Although
20 Crystal Marchesoni, "United We Stand, Divided We Fall"?: The Controversy Surround-
ing a Possible Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 37 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 1263, 1264 (2005).
21 The total number of appeals commenced or pending for all circuits between April 1, 2004
and March 31, 2005 equaled 112,394, while the total number for the Ninth Circuit during
that same period equaled 27,441, and the total number for the Second Circuit during that
period was 15,171. See Admin. Office of the U. S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statis-
tics 22-25 tbl.B-1 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/B01mar05.pdf
[hereinafter "Caseload Statistics"].
22 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001).
23 Letter from Alex Kozinski, U.S. Circuit Judge, 9th Cir., to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., U.S.
Circuit Judge, 3rd Cir. 5 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.nonpublication.com/kozin-
skiletter.pdf [hereinafter "Kozinski Letter"].
24 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178; cf. Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions:
A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 67, 96 (2004) ("The additional time
necessary to transform an unpublished disposition into a published opinion might also be
related to judges' egos.") (emphasis in original).
25 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178.
26 Kozinski Letter, supra note 23, at 5.
27 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 275 (1996)
("Clerks and central staff screen the appeals to determine how much judge time should be
allocated to each case. These para-judicial personnel also recommend whether oral argu-
ment should be granted and whether a full opinion (or, indeed, any opinion) should be writ-
ten."); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 69-70 (1980) (arguing that
increased caseloads leave judges with no alternative but to rely heavily on law clerks); but
cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-59 (1996)
(arguing that the increase in the number of law clerks per judge has led to the greater delega-
tion of judicial responsibility).
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some scholars have questioned the value of such delegation, 8 it is practiced in
one form or another throughout the entire federal court system.29 This delega-
tion has been extended to the area of unpublished opinions as well. Unpub-
lished opinions, unlike other opinions, are generally not written by the judges
whose names appear on the decisions,3 ° but rather are written by law clerks. 3
For example, in the Ninth Circuit, many unpublished decisions are first drafted
by law clerks who then present the decision to a three-judge panel in camera.32
Each case is then given only five to ten minutes of consideration by the full
panel.33 Although the judges insist that they are careful to ensure that the right
result is reached in each case, these time constraints leave "simply no time or
opportunity for the judges to fine-tune the language of the disposition. 34 The
remaining unpublished decisions that come from the Ninth Circuit are merely
converted bench memos that have only been edited "by adding a caption and
changing the beginning and the ending ... [leaving] protracted discussions of
the facts - some relevant, some not - and discussion of such noncontroversial
matters as the standard of review ... [without checking] the language for latent
ambiguities or misinterpretations. '35 Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski argues
that allowing citation to unpublished opinions "as if they represented more than
the bare result as explicated by some law clerk or staff attorney - is a particu-
larly subtle and insidious form of fraud." 36 Another judge has echoed Kozin-
ski's concern regarding the low value of unpublished opinions due to the fact
that judges tend to "rely on recent graduates from supposedly excellent law
schools for the writing and most of the editing" of unpublished opinions.3 7
B. Arguments Against the Use of Limited Citation Rules
1. Unpublished Opinions Are Available Equally
Although unavailability of the unpublished opinions was a common justi-
fication for the use of limited citation rules, 38 this justification has recently lost
most of its force. West Publishing began collecting, classifying and including
28 Kenneth J. Schmeir & Michael K. Schmeir, Has Anyone Noticed the Judiciary's Aban-
donment of Stare Decisis?, 7 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 233, 245-46 (2005) ("While this has
not proved to be true, we think no-citation rules hide quality control problems resulting from
the delegation of appellate decision-making to law clerks.").
29 Federal Judicial Center, Staff Attorney Offices Help Manage Rising Caseloads, http://
www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/stffattys.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
30 See Wasby, supra note 24, at 96 ("While the panel members' names appear on unpub-
lished dispositions, the dispositions are not signed; if the name of an individual judge is not
attached to the disposition as author, there is less need to polish the writing.").
31 Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at
43-44.
32 Kozinski Letter, supra note 23, at 5.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 7.
37 See Wasby, supra note 24, at 95 (quoting the comments of Ninth Circuit Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin).
38 J. Thomas Sullivan, Unpublished Opinions and No Citation Rules in the Trial Courts, 47
ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 423 (2005) ("The court noted that allowing practitioners to rely on
unpublished opinions would compound the burdens and costs of legal research necessary for
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unpublished opinions of the appeals courts on Westlaw in 2000, but it was not
until late 2001 that West announced it would start publishing those decisions
via the Federal Appendix. 39 Due to uncertain usability of the unpublished deci-
sions, the announcement also indicated that West would "include a caveat...
with each case to let customers know that these opinions were not selected for
publication in the Federal Reporter."4° Although initial reaction from scholars
seemed skeptical about how publishing these supposed unpublished opinions
would work, 4 ' the Third Circuit quickly embraced the notion of making unpub-
lished opinions available to the public by putting them up on its website so they
could "be picked up, archived and indexed by electronic publishers such as
Westlaw. ' '4 2 Because of these steps, unpublished opinions are now as easily
accessed and researched as are any other published cases.
2. Limited Citation Rules Lead to Inconsistent/Conflicting Applications
of Law
Although defenders of unpublished opinions claim "the overwhelming
majority of unpublished opinions are actually useless for future litigation
because they involve no new law,"4 3 but rather only the application of well
established legal principles, some scholars argue unpublished opinions often
reflect a lack of consistency in the application of the law.' Examples of this
lack of consistency can be found at both the intra-4 5 and inter-circuit levels.46
A lack of consistency can also be found in unpublished opinions where the
legal principle applied is not based upon "settled" precedent.47 Where the law
effective client representation. The court concluded that the potential prejudice caused by
disparate access to unpublished opinions warranted their exclusion at the trial court level.").
39 West Launches Research Library & Coverage of Unpublished Decisions, LEGAL PUB-
LISHER, Sept. 30, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 4196099.
40 Id.
41 Richard A. Leiter, AALL Exhibits 2001: An Annual Review, LEGAL INFORMATION ALERT,
July 1, 2001, at 5 ("Readers, I beg your sympathy for all legal research instructors of the
world who will now have to figure out a way of teaching students what an 'unpublished
opinion' is. I haven't the foggiest.").
42 The 3rd Circuit Gets It Right on Non-Precedential Opinions, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 25, 2002, at 9.
" Kozinski Letter, supra note 23, at 12 (quoting J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 433, 492 (1994)).
4 Sullivan, supra note 38, at 447.
45 See Mosten Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Zurich-American Ins. Group, 62 F. App'x 175, 179 (9th
Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority's opinion was inconsistent with
case precedent); Favreau v. Chemcentral Corp., No. 94-56707, 1997 WL 85281, at *8 (9th
Cir. Feb. 27, 1997) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in part) ("By struggling to make something out
of nothing, the majority creates conflicts both with California law and our own caselaw.").
46 See Williams v. County of Santa Barbara, 152 F. App'x 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bybee,
J., dissenting) ("I believe the majority's overly restrictive interpretation is inconsistent with
the purposes and plain language of the statute."); United States v. Ramirez-Soberanes, No.
99-4097, 2000 WL 369348, at *7 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (Lucero, J., dissenting in part)
("With its holding today, the majority creates a circuit split in this area of Batson
jurisprudence.").
41 See He v. Gonzales, 160 F. App'x 637, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bybee, J., dissenting) ("I
am unaware of any case, besides this one, where this Court has applied the doctrine of
equitable tolling after a litigant has already raised his claim .... The rationale of the majority
opinion seems to allow a petitioner to raise arguments indefinitely, essentially granting peti-
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is unsettled, litigants are unable to use these unpublished opinions to help their
arguments, even where there are no other sources of law on the issue. By not
allowing this type of citation the courts are in effect prohibiting the litigants
from narrowly defining the true issues, because each "unsettled" issue previ-
ously decided in an unpublished opinion will have to be relitigated and a new
result may be obtained.4 8 This allows multiple panels of the same circuit to
reach different conclusions on virtually identical issues and thereby create
inconsistency of law within the circuit.
A third inconsistency is created by the limited citation rules themselves.
By their express terms, limited citation rules prohibit only citation of unpub-
lished opinions to, or by, the courts of the circuit in which the limited citation
rule was created.4 9 This creates an inconsistency whereby attorneys or courts
in other circuits are free to cite, and discuss, unpublished opinions of different
circuits, even where the opinion could not be cited in the authoring circuit.5 °
These attorneys and courts thus rely upon the unpublished opinion as represen-
tative of the law of the authoring circuit, despite the fact that this may not be
the case.5
Further, the circuits often fail to enforce their own limited citation rules.
According to one judge "[d]espite our rule, parties do on occasion cite unpub-
lished dispositions to the [courts] of our circuit, and I have read a number of
transcripts in which an unpublished disposition was the subject of discus-
sion."5 2 It is likely parties disobey the limited citation rules due to the circuit's
lack of consistent enforcement thereof.53 The district courts, too, while
acknowledging the circuit's limited citation rule, cite to unpublished opinions
tioner an unlimited window in which to assert his claims. I am unaware of any other area in
our jurisprudence where such a perpetual right exists."); Sosa-Hernandez v. INS, No. 99-
70358, 2000 WL 734641, at *2 (9th Cir. June 7, 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The
majority has not cited authority for the proposition that the victim of persecution has to
prove who his persecutors were and I do not think that the proposition is correct.").
48 However, as Judge Kozinski noted, nothing would prevent a litigant from copying the
research and reasoning wholesale from an unpublished opinion. See Alex Kozinski, In
Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, FED. LAW., June 2004, at
37.
41 See 9TH CIR. R. App. P. 36-3(b).
50 See Newborn v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 04-00659, 2006 WL 1409769, at *9 (D.D.C. May 23,
2006) (citing Invision Media Servs., Inc. v. Lerner, 175 F. App'x 904 (9th Cir. 2006));
Johnson v. Structured Asset Servs., LLC, 148 S.W.3d 711, 729-30 (Tex Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing Short v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 107 F. App'x 738 (9th Cir. 2004));
Brown v. City of Milwaukee, 288 F.Supp 2d 962, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (discussing Meyers
v. Nagel, No. 90-35718, 1992 WL 92798, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1992)); Slaughter v. City
of Philadelphia, No. 94-2329, 1995 WL 12060, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) (unpub-
lished) (citing Pettes v. Goldman, No. 87-2670, 1988 WL 57690 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1988)).
51 See Slaughter, 1995 WL 12060 at *4 n.3 ("This unpublished opinion is not precedential
but as an opinion filed of public record which presumably reflects the considered judgment
of the panel, it is instructive.").
52 Kozinski Letter, supra note 23, at 2-3.
3 For example in Singh v. Gonzales, 125 F. App'x 888 (9th Cir. 2005), petitioner's citation
to Kemi v. Ashcroft, 102 F. App'x 65 (9th Cir. 2004) in his opening brief went completely
unmentioned or punished. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 6-7, Singh, 125 F. App'x 888
(No. 03-74178).
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for legal principles.54 Even the circuit court judges themselves will occasion-
ally disregard the circuit's limited citations rule and cite an unpublished
* . 55opinion.
C. Limited Citation Rules in the Context of Precedent
1. Anastasoff v. United States: 56 Eighth Circuit Finds Its Limited
Citation Rule
Writing for the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Judge
Richard Arnold held the Eighth Circuit's limited citation rule unconstitu-
tional. 57 The appellant in Anastasoff argued that the "Mailbox Rule"58 under
26 U.S.C. § 7502 should be applied to refund claims for overpaid federal
income tax under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b).59 However, this exact argument had
been raised in front of, and been rejected by, a previous Eighth Circuit panel in
Christie v. United States.60 Appellant claimed that because Christie was not
selected for publication, the Eighth Circuit's limited citation rule 61 denied it
precedential effect and the court would not be bound to follow it.62 The court,
however, disagreed.
Judge Arnold first noted that "[i]nherent in every decision is a declaration
and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. This declaration of the
law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied
in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties."6 3 Judge Arnold thus stated
that all decisions carry with them a precedential statement of the law which
binds future courts. Judge Arnold further stated, a "judge's duty to follow pre-
cedent derives from the nature of the judicial power itself."'  This is so
because in order to exercise the judicial power, a judge must first determine the
law.65
Judge Arnold argued the Framers understood the judicial power to implic-
itly include the doctrine of precedent,6 6 and the lack of a reporting system at
14 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Davis, 430 F. Supp 2d 1112, 1130-31 n.10 (D. Haw. 2006) (dis-
cussing N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hirakawa, 68 F. App'x 835, 836 (9th Cir. 2003), while also
stating: "The Court does not rely on the foregoing unpublished opinion as precedent pursu-
ant to U.S.Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 36-3, although the Court does find the opinion to be
illustrative.").
55 See Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Operadora Dulcinea, No. 94-15610, 1995 WL
756276, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 1995) (citing Procare Labs., Inc. v. Gull Labs., Inc., No 93-
16623, 1995 WL 110137 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995)).
56 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
57 Id. at 905.
58 The "Mailbox Rule" provides that claims are received when postmarked, rather than
when physically received. See 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (2004).
59 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
6 Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20,
1992) (unpublished).
61 8TH CIR. R. App. P. 28A(i).
62 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
63 Id. at 899-900 (citation omitted).
64 Id. at 901.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 901-2.
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the time of the founding did not limit a decision's precedential effect.67 Judge
Arnold stated that because the Framers understood the doctrine of precedent to
arise out of "the nature of the judicial power itself," they must have
"intended[ ] the doctrine of precedent [to limit] the 'judicial power' delegated
to the courts in Article 111., "68 Thus, because the Eighth Circuit's limited cita-
tion rule allows the court to deny precedent to the cases it so chooses, the rule
"expands the judicial power beyond the limits set by Article III ... allowing
[the court] complete discretion to determine which judicial decisions will bind
[the court] and which will not." 69
Because the court found the portion of the Eighth Circuit's limited citation
rule which makes unpublished cases non-precedential unconstitutional, it found
Christie to be controlling and ruled against the appellant.7" However, follow-
ing the decision, the appellant filed a petition for an en banc hearing.7 While
waiting for that hearing, the parties reached a settlement agreement.7 2 The en
banc court found the settlement made the decision of the prior panel moot.
73
Once again writing for the court, Judge Arnold reluctantly stated "[t]he consti-
tutionality of that portion of Rule 28A(i) which says that unpublished opinions
have no precedential effect remains an open question in this Circuit. '74 Thus,
despite the first Anastasoff, the constitutionality of limited citation rules still
remained an open question.
2. Hart v. Massanari: 75 Judge Kozinski's Rebuttal
With this question still open, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski weighed
in. The appellant in Hart v. Massanari cited an unpublished opinion in his
opening brief.7 6 Because this violated the Ninth Circuit's limited citation
rule,77 the court ordered the appellant's counsel to show cause why he should
not be sanctioned.78 Counsel, relying upon the ruling in the first Anastasoff,
argued that the Ninth Circuit's limited citation rule was unconstitutional. 79 The
court disagreed.8"
Judge Kozinski first attacked the credibility of Anastasoff by pointing out
it "may be the first case in the history of the Republic to hold that the phrase
'judicial Power' encompasses a specific command that limits the power of the
67 Id. at 903 ("[T]he Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting system as an impedi-
ment to the precedential authority of a judicial decision ... judges and lawyers of the day
recognized the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by
memory or by a lawyer's unpublished memorandum.") (citation omitted).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 905.
70 Id.
71 Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1056.
74 Id.
71 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
76 Id. at 1158-9.
" 9TH CIR. R. App. P. 36-3.
78 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
79 Id.
80 Id. ("[Anastasoff] may seduce members of our bar into violating our Rule 36-3 under the
mistaken impression that it is unconstitutional. We write to lay these speculations to rest.").
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federal courts."8 Rather, Judge Kozinski argued "the term 'judicial Power' in
Article III is more likely descriptive than prescriptive. 82 Because of this
belief, and the fact that the doctrine of precedent is not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution, Judge Kozinski argued the doctrine was not intended to be
given constitutional status.8 3
Judge Kozinski noted several court practices that existed at the time of the
framing, including allowing juries to determine not just fact but also what the
law was;8 4 appellate court judges writing individual opinions rather than having
one unitary decision voicing the opinion of the majority;8 5 and allowing trial
court judges to take part in hearing appeals of their own decisions,8 6 that are no
longer considered good practices. 87 Thus, allowing courts to find the phrase
"judicial Power" to encompass such practices leads to the "risk that this will
allow judges to pick and choose those ancient practices they find salutary as a
matter of policy, and give them constitutional status."88
According to Judge Kozinski, "[c]ase precedent at common law . . .
resembled much more what we call persuasive authority than the binding
authority . . . of the federal judicial system today." 89 The modem concept of
binding precedent instead did not come about until the vertical and horizontal
organization of the courts,9 ° the establishment of a more complete reporting
system,9 and a changed belief that a court's decision is not merely evidence of
what the law is, but rather the decision itself is the law.9" As a result of these
factors, the first panel of a court of appeals "to consider an issue sets the law
not only for all the inferior courts in the circuit, but also future panels of the
court of appeals." 93 Once this precedent has been established the other courts
are bound to follow it even if they consider it to be incorrect or unwise.9 4 This
binding precedent must be followed until overturned by the Supreme Court, or
the appeals court of the same circuit sitting en banc.9 5 Judge Kozinski noted
however, that although a prior panel's decision is binding on future panels of
the same circuit and the inferior courts of that circuit, it is not binding on other
circuits or their inferior courts.96 If the understanding of precedent in Anas-
tasoff were correct, the decisions of the first panel to hear a certain matter
81 Id. at 1160.
82 Id. at 1161.
83 Id. at 1163 ("[I]n order to follow the path forged by Anastasoff, we would have to be
convinced that the practice in question was one the Framers considered so integral and well-
understood that they did not have to bother stating it, even though they spelled out many
other limitations in considerable detail.").
84 Id. at 1162.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1163.
89 Id. at 1175.
90 Id. at 1170.
91 Id. at 1168.
92 Id. at 1170.
93 Id. at 1171.
94 Id. at 1170. This is commonly referred to as the "prior panel rule."
95 Id. at 1171.
96 Id. at 1172-73.
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would be binding precedent on all circuits and their inferior courts. 97 Judge
Kozinski reasoned that the fact this does not happen is a reflection of judicial
policy in the structure and organization of the federal courts,9 8 which could not
be controlling if the doctrine of precedent were a constitutional limitation.9 9
Judge Kozinski also pointed to the fact trial court decisions do not create bind-
ing precedent for other trial courts, even those in the same district.' 0 0 Judge
Kozinski argued this could not be a correct result if the understanding in Anas-
tasoff were correct because "the Constitution vests the same 'judicial Power' in
all federal courts" and applies equally to the trial courts.1 '
Judge Kozinski then argued the Ninth Circuit's limited citation rule is a
limitation on the doctrine of precedent created to further judicial policy.1"2
Due to the limited resources of the appeals courts, Judge Kozinski argued
unpublished opinions allow the courts to manage their caseload much like the
Supreme Court manages its caseload through discretionary review.103 Judge
Kozinski pointed out unpublished opinions do not indicate a lack of reasoned
analysis, but merely are "not written in a way that will be fully intelligible to
those unfamiliar with the case, and the rule of law is not announced in a way
that makes it suitable for governing future cases." 1" Judge Kozinski further
contended that allowing citation to unpublished opinions would cause the time
gained from writing such opinions to vanish, 10 5 as judges would have to spend
more time reflecting upon the language used in fear it would be distorted in
future cases.10 6 According to Judge Kozinski, since unpublished cases often
involve non-novel issues, making all opinions precedential increases the
chances of inadvertent differences in language expressing the standard or
rule.10 7 Although minor, these differences may "have significantly different
implications when read in light of future fact patterns" leading to inadvertent
intracircuit conflicts which can only be resolved by en banc review.10 8 As
Kozinski pointed out: "[in the end, we do not believe that more law makes for
better law."10 9 Because the court found the doctrine of precedent to be based in
judicial policy rather than constitutionally mandated, it ruled that the Ninth
Circuit's limited citation rule is constitutional. 1 o
97 Id. at 1176.
98 Id. at 1173.
99 Id. at 1176.
100 Id. at 1174.
101 Id. at 1176.
102 See id. at 1177.
103 Id.; see also, infra Section V.C.
104 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177-78.
105 Id. at 1178.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1179.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1180 n.39.
1o Id. at 1180. The Court also found that Appellant's counsel should not be sanctioned for
violating Rule 36-3 due to the doubt Anastasoff raised. Id.
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III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF RULE 32.1
Amidst this battle regarding the propriety of unpublished opinions and
limited citation rules, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 was proposed
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, codified in U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077. The
Rules Enabling Act, which Congress originally enacted as part of New Deal era
reform, sets forth the procedure by which federal courts create uniform rules of
procedure to be followed within the respective court. 1 The Rules Enabling
Act specifically grants federal appellate courts the power "from time to time to
prescribe rules for the conduct of their business."11 2 An example of such a
court rule is Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 discussed supra. Despite this grant of
power to prescribe local rules of procedure, however, the Rules Enabling Act
requires such rules be consistent with the uniform rules which govern all appel-
late courts. 3 Therefore, local rules such as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 become
moot where contrary to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, such as pro-
posed Rule 32.1.
As for the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, they too are promulgated
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 grants the
Supreme Court "the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for cases in the United States ... courts of appeals." '114
Rules proposed under this section are subject to a complicated adoption pro-
cess. First, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, which is one of five
advisory committees currently existing under the Rules Enabling Act,1 15
prepares a report containing the proposed rule, and an explanatory note discuss-
ing the rule's purpose.1 6 The report is then reviewed by the Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which, if it accepts the Advisory
Committee's recommendation, refers the proposed rule back to the Advisory
Committee for public review and comment.1 17 During the public review and
comment process, the Advisory Committee conducts extensive public hearings
on the proposed rule, reviews letters of support or criticism, and takes testi-
mony from various concerned parties. 1 8 If, after the public review and com-
ment process the Advisory Committee still recommends adoption of the
proposed rule, it prepares another report for the Standing Committee, which in
turn recommends adoption of the proposal, makes changes to the proposed rule
then recommends adoption, or rejects the proposed rule in its entirety." 9
I Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and
the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1303, 1309 (2006).
112 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2004).
113 See id.
114 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2004).
115 The other four are the Advisory Committees on Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal and Eviden-
tiary Rules. See David A. Schlueter, Who Makes the Rules?, 20 CRIM. JUST., 58, 58 (2006).
116 Edward H. Cooper, Symposium Reflections: A Rulemaking Perspective, 57 MERCER L.
REV. 839, 840 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2004).
117 Cooper, supra note 116, at 840.
118 Id.
119 David A. Schlueter, How Rules Are Made: A Brief Review, 21 CRIM. JUST. 50, 50
(2006).
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The Standing Committee then delivers its recommendation to the Judicial
Conference, and the Judicial Conference delivers its recommendation to the
Supreme Court. 121 The Supreme Court then is charged with the duty of adopt-
ing the rule as proposed, making modifications, or rejecting the proposed
rule.12 ' If the Supreme Court adopts the proposed rule, it must then deliver "to
the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which [the] rule . . .is to
become effective a copy of the proposed rule [which] shall take effect no ear-
lier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted."'
' 22
With respect to proposed Rule 32.1, on May 22, 2003, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Appellate Rules, to which then Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
John G. Roberts, Jr. were committee chair and member respectively, 123 pro-
posed Rule 32.1 to the Standing Committee. 124 Later, after taking testimony on
Rule 32.1's potential impact, 125 on April 13, 2004, the Advisory Committee
formally approved Rule 32.1.126 However, the Standing Committee referred
the proposed rule back to the Advisory Committee on June 17, 2004, for further
study. 12 7 Following additional study, the Advisory Committee submitted Rule
32.1 to the Standing Committee for final approval on May 6, 2005.128 The
Standing Committee voted to approve Rule 32.1 on June 15, 2005,129 and the
Judicial Conference delivered Rule 32.1 to the Supreme Court on November
29, 2005.130
Finally, on April 12, 2006, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 32.1 and sub-
mitted it to Congress.' 3 1 The Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 32.1 was of
little surprise for those following its progress given that former members of the
Advisory Committee which proposed and adopted the Rule, Roberts and Alito,
120 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2004).
121 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2004).
122 Id. at § 2074 (2004).
123 See Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Rules Comm. Membership List 2 (2003),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Committee Membership Lists/STRoster_2003.pdf.
124 Letter from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 30 (May 22,
2003) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app08O3.pdf [hereinafter "Alito Letter"].
125 With over 500 public comments submitted to the Advisory Committee, Rule 32.1 was
"the second-most commented-on proposal in federal rulemaking history." Editorial, FRAP
32.1, N.J. LAW., May 8, 2006, at 938.
126 Stephanie F. Ward, Giving Their Opinions: Committee Backs Rule Allowing Lawyers to
Cite Unpublished Decisions, A.B.A. JOURNAL E-REPORT (April 23, 2004), available at http:/
/www.nonpublication.com/ward.htm.
127 Brent Kendall, Citation-Rule Change Hits Obstacle, L.A. DAILY J., June 18, 2004, at 4.
128 Letter from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, to
Judge David F. Levy, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (May 6,
2005), available at http://www.nonpublication.comalitomemo2.pdf.
129 Jeff Chorney, Conference to Mull Unpublished Opinions, THE RECORDER, June 16,
2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 119270949530.
130 Howard J. Bashman, Decisions to be Cited Manage to Insert a Fly in the Ointment, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 12, 2005, at 5.
"I' See Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
House 1 (Apr. 12, 2006) available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/
frap06p.pdf [hereinafter "Roberts Letter"].
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were now Justices of the Supreme Court. 132 Assuming Congress does not
make any changes to Rule 32.1 prior to December 1, 2006, it will go into effect
on that day. 13
3
IV. THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF RULE 32.1
A. Future Courts Will Give the Unpublished Opinions Too Much Weight
As submitted to Congress, Rule 32.1 provides:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not pre-
cedent," or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, judgment, or
other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible electronic
database, the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or
disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
13 4
This language does not address what precedential value should be given to
unpublished opinions. In fact the Committee Note expressly states that the
Rule takes no position on that point.1 35 Instead the Committee Note suggests
parties could, at the very minimum, cite unpublished opinions for their persua-
sive value. The Committee Note states that unlike binding precedent "[a]n
opinion cited for its 'persuasive value' . . . is cited because the party hopes that
it will influence the court as, say, a law review article might - that is, simply by
virtue of the thoroughness of its research or the persuasiveness of its reason-
ing."13  The Committee Note suggests Rule 32.1 will allow parties to cite
unpublished opinions for this purpose.
However, a party citing an unpublished opinion is generally not doing so
merely for this persuasive value. Instead the party is attempting to increase the
credibility of its position by showing a prior panel has endorsed its reasoning.
Thus, the party is indicating to the current panel that because a prior panel of
the same court decided the issue in a particular way in the past, so too should
the current panel. Because of the tradition of the prior panel rule, the subse-
quent panel will, as a practical matter, feel bound by the prior decision. One
judge has already expressed this concern, stating that "we expect that [unpub-
lished opinions] will be accorded significant precedential effect, simply
because the judges of a court will be naturally reluctant to repudiate or ignore
132 John G. Roberts, Jr., was confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on September
29, 2005. See Kathy Kiely & Jean Biskupic, Roberts Era Begins on Supreme Court, USA
TODAY, Sept. 30, 2005, at IA. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. was confirmed as a Justice of the
Supreme Court on January 31, 2006. See Maura Reynolds, A Stark Division in Vote for
Alito, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at Al.
133 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2004).
114 See Roberts Letter, supra note 131, at 5-6.
135 Alito Letter, supra note 124, at 33.
136 Id. at 34.
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previous decisions."' 37 This reluctance would be even greater in the lower
courts. As one scholar has pointed out, "[i]t will be a rare district court judge
who will ignore an unpublished opinion of the circuit that will review his or her
decision... [because] lower courts will have to treat them as though they were
binding, even if that is not technically true."' 13 8 This reluctance will in effect
make each unpublished opinion binding precedent.
B. Quality of Opinions Will Decline
Ideally, when making a decision the appellate court judges should have
enough time for: "(1) reviewing party briefs; (2) attending oral argument; (3)
participating in judicial conference; (4) memorializing their personal assess-
ment of the case, with such memorandum being circulated simultaneously with
the argument and conference; (5) drafting opinion(s); (6) circulating opinion(s)
for comment; and (7) finalizing the opinion for subsequent publication." '13 9
However, this ideal process of appellate review is rarely followed due to time
constraints. 14
0
Instead, the judges must turn to the use of unpublished opinions in order to
keep up with their growing workload. Unpublished opinions generally serve
only as a cursory explanation of the court's rationale intended to be used by the
parties involved, or the court below. 141 Thus, unpublished opinions are gener-
ally short documents more concerned with indicating the result rather than the
reasoning behind the result or the language used to express it.' 42 As one judge
commented, "[the] efficiency [of unpublished opinions] is made possible only
when the authoring judge has confidence that short-hand statements, clearly
understood by the parties, will not later be scrutinized for their legal signifi-
cance by a panel not privy to the specifics of the case at hand.' 4 3 Because the
authoring judge need not worry about the unpublished case being used in
another context, that judge is able to write these in short periods of time, or
delegate the assignment to a law clerk.144
This saved time allows judges to concentrate more thoroughly on their
published opinions. However, because Rule 32.1 will make these unpublished
opinions citable, judges will have no choice but to concern themselves with the
quality of the reasoning and writing which goes into these opinions. Thus,
Rule 32.1 will in effect require the judges to spend as much time on these
'I Letter from John L. Coffey et al., Circuit Judges, 7th Cir., to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules I (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.secretjus-
tice.org/pdf-files/Comments/03-AP-396.pdf.
138 Patrick J. Schiltz, Response: The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 40 (2005).
139 Diane Adams-Strickland, Don't Quote Me: The Law of Judicial Communications in
Federal Appellate Practice and the Constitutionality of Proposed Rule 32.1, 14 CoMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 133, 161 (2005).
140 See id. at 162.
141 Schiltz, supra note 138, at 33.
142 Letter from John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, 2d Cir., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y of the
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 7 (Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.secret
justice.org/pdf-files/Comments/03-AP-329.pdf.
143 Id.
"'4 See supra Section II.A.2.
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unpublished opinions as they would on published opinions, all without a reduc-
tion in their caseload.145 This will require the judges to spend less time work-
ing on novel issues and cases that would normally be published, thus reducing
their quality. After all, judges "simply do not have the time to engage in [the
necessary writing] process as to each of the 450 or so cases each judge.., is
responsible for every year."' 46 This additional time and effort which will be
required will also mean already busy judges will become busier, resulting in
greater delays for the parties.' 47 These time delays will only be compacted by
the fact Rule 32.1 will allow parties to cite more cases in their briefs, thus
requiring more research on the part of the judges and their law clerks. 14 8
However, time conscious judges will feel pressured to produce opinions as
quickly as possible. One way in which they may try to compensate for the lack
of time is by issuing one-word or one-line opinions. The judges who resort to
these will not have to fear having the opinion cited back to them in the future
because the opinion will be of little value to anyone, including the original
parties. However, these one-liners are very unappealing. As one scholar notes,
such "dispositions are unfair to the parties, who are entitled to some explana-
tion of why they won or lost an appeal, as well as to some assurance that their
arguments were read, understood, and taken seriously."' 149 Both the parties and
judges of lower courts will be left without knowing what rule or reasoning the
appellate court found controlling. 150 Thus the parties will not know what to
argue if an en banc hearing is requested and the judges of the lower courts will
not know what to do in the future.
Some scholars point out that the argument against Rule 32.1 based upon a
fear of reduced opinion quality shows major flaws in the current state of our
legal system.'15 They argue the court should have enough time to provide each
litigant with a well thought out and thorough decision in every case,152 and the
use of low quality unpublished opinions is not justified by a lack of court
resources.' 53 They argue instead, if the problem is judges lack the time they
need to dedicate to each opinion they write, perhaps a better solution would be
to increase the number of judges. 154 Although this may be true, because Rule
32.1 does not address this problem, courts like the Ninth Circuit will still be left
with an overwhelming docket and little means to reduce it.
'15 Schiltz, supra note 138, at 73 ("Congress cannot give courts fewer resources to handle
more cases and expect nothing to change.").
146 Kozinski, supra note 48, at 40.
141 Schiltz, supra note 138, at 36.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 37.
15o Id.
'"I See David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1133, 1174 (2002).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1147.
151 Id. at 1166; see also infra Section V.B.
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C. The Proposed Rule Will Create Inconsistency Between Federal and
State Procedure
One proffered reason for Rule 32.1 is it will promote consistency between
the circuits when it comes to citation rules, thus alleviating hardships to attor-
neys who practice in multiple circuits. 5 However, this argument fails to note
the fact most attorneys do not practice in multiple circuits, but rather practice in
state and federal courts within one circuit.1 56 Thus, Rule 32.1 would only alle-
viate inconsistency for the average attorney if the state in which the attorney
practices permits citation to unpublished opinions. However, for most attor-
neys practicing in the Ninth Circuit, Rule 32.1 will actually create an inconsis-
tency between state and federal citation rules because citation to unpublished
opinions is not allowed in the state courts.' 57 Thus, at least one Ninth Circuit
judge has cited this confusion among the grounds for opposing Rule 32.1 158
Another potential source of inconsistency created by Rule 32.1 would be
determining which unpublished opinions could be cited. Because Rule 32.1
will make only opinions issued after January 1, 2007, citable, it could create
confusion for parties and courts because each will have to determine which
unpublished decisions may be cited and which may not.' 5 9 It may also create
confusion for parties who must decide what to do if judges cite "pre-2007
unpublished cases knowing that the opinion they are writing may be cited (even
if it is unpublished), but the older unpublished 'authority' they are relying on
may not, depending on the jurisdiction." 6 ' The diligent attorney will have to
determine what effect that citation by the court would have on the attorney's
ability to cite the authority as well. Will the reference of a pre-2007 unpub-
lished opinion in a post-2007 citable opinion thus make the prior opinion cita-
ble, or is it still off limits? Also, what is to become of the attorney who cites a
pre-2007 unpublished case? The answers to these questions are not readily
apparent from the text of Rule 32.1 or the Committee Note.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF FRAP 32.1
A. Splitting the Ninth Circuit
Judge Kozinski gives numerous reasons why he is opposed to Rule
32.1 .161 However, one potential reason neither he nor others have addressed
relates to splitting the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is like
no other federal circuit court. It covers a larger geographic area than any of the
other circuits, encompasses the largest population of any circuit, and it has by
155 Schiltz, supra note 138, at 30-31.
156 Id. at 31.
"' See CAL. R. App. P. 977 (prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions or memorandum
decisions); see also, ARIz. R. Civ. App. P. 28 (same).
158 Kozinski, supra note 48, at 41.
159 Randy Diamond, Advancing Public Interest Practitioner Research Skills in Legal Edu-
cation, 7 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 67, 105 (2005).
160 Id. at 105-6.
161 See Kozinski Letter, supra note 23.
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far the most judges and the largest case load. 162 For more than twenty-five
years, Congress has considered proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit and create
one or more new circuits. 163 In 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent out
one such bill that the full Senate failed to pass. 164 In 1998, the White Commis-
sion urged Congress to divide the Ninth Circuit into three semi-autonomous
"adjudicative divisions" which would "capitalize on the benefits of smaller
decisional units." 165 Despite this suggestion, the Judicial Conference simply
recommended seven new appellate judgeships for the Ninth Circuit without
making mention of the proposal to split the court.
16 6
How might this affect Judge Kozinski's view of Rule 32.1? Judge Kozin-
ski has been a staunch opponent of splitting the Ninth Circuit,1 67 and although
the notion of splitting the Ninth Circuit has been met with great controversy
and resistance, such action may be more likely given the added burdens
brought by Rule 32.1. Thus, the passage of Rule 32.1 may bring the Ninth
Circuit one step closer to its ultimate split.
168
Splitting the Ninth Circuit is an obvious solution to the increased burden
which will result due to Rule 32.1. The Ninth Circuit's enormous size is with-
out a doubt a substantial factor in making the caseload as big as it currently is.
Splitting the Ninth Circuit would reduce the number of judges on each resulting
court, thus reducing the number of potential three-judge panels. By doing this
each judge would be able better to keep abreast of recent trends in the circuit's
jurisprudence, which would greatly reduce the number of conflicting and
inconsistent opinions. It would also allow for a simpler en banc procedure.
Due to its size, the Ninth Circuit is not presently capable of convening together
all of its judges as one. Instead, the en banc system used by the Ninth Circuit
only requires en banc cases be heard by a panel of eleven active judges. 169
Thus, these eleven judges must determine the rule of law for an entire circuit
which consists of approximately fifty total judgeships. 7o This then allows for
a situation in which a viewpoint held by an overall minority of judges within
162 Lori Irish Bauman, Split Over Splitting: Impasse Persists on Proposal to Split the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, OR. ST. BAR BULL., Apr. 2004, at 15.
163 Id.
16 Pamela Ann Rymer, How Big is Too Big?, 15 J.L. & POL'v 383, 383 (1999).
165 Comm'n on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals, Final Report 47
(Dec. 18, 1998) available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf [here-
inafter "Final Report"].
166 Bauman, supra note 162, at 15.
167 Justin Scheck, 9th Circuit Split Proponents Attack Case Overload, THE RECORDER, July
17, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1152867927545.
168 This should be cause for alarm for Judge Kozinski considering the impact such a split
may have upon him personally. Of the judges currently seated on the Ninth Circuit, there are
only three active status judges who have seniority over Judge Kozinski; Chief Judge Mary
Schroeder, Judges Harry Pregerson and Stephen Reinhardt. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 45 none
of these three judges will be eligible to serve as the next Chief Judge when Chief Judge
Schroeder's term expires in December 2007; leaving Judge Kozinski next in line to reign as
Chief Judge over the largest circuit in the nation.
169 Judge John M. Roll, Splitting the Ninth Circuit: It's Time, ARIZ. ATr'Y., Sept. 2005, at
36.
170 Id. ("As of December 2004, in addition to 28 authorized active circuit judgeships, the
circuit had 23 senior circuit judges ... ").
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the Ninth Circuit can become the controlling stance articulated en banc. Split-
ting the Ninth Circuit would eliminate this scenario and thereby create jurispru-
dence more representative of the majority opinion. However, splitting the
Ninth Circuit alone may not be able to reduce the caseload to a manageable size
without doing more, such as adding more judgeships, or limiting appeals as of
right, which are as discussed below.
B. Adding More Judges to the Bench
Most efforts to split the Ninth Circuit have included provisions adding
new judgeships to both the old and new circuits.' 7 ' In fact, adding more judge-
ships to the Ninth Circuit has always been a clear, although controversial, solu-
tion to the Ninth Circuit's docket control problem. After all, the Ninth Circuit
covers over "110 authorized active district judges, more than 50 senior district
judges, 68 authorized bankruptcy judges, and 94 authorized full-time magis-
trate judges." ' This large number of lower courts has lead to an ever-increas-
ing need for appellate review. Yet despite this need, Congress has been
hesitant to add more judges to the Ninth Circuit. One reason for this hesitation
may be due to the 1998 White Commission report which stated "the maximum
number of judges for an effective appellate court functioning as a single deci-
sional unit is somewhere between eleven and seventeen."' 17
3
One problem with creating excessively large circuits is that adding more
judgeships will increase the different number of potential panels which would
have to represent the views of one circuit. Based upon the current makeup of
the Ninth Circuit, there are 19,600 different three-judge panels which could be
created, thus greatly increasing the likelihood of panel-driven results and reduc-
ing collegiality between judges. 174
A second problem identified with adding more judgeships is that adding
judgeships decreases the prestige and power of the position, and exclusivity is
the only way it can be maintained.1 75 However this argument, which is mostly
based upon the vanity of the court, has never been clearly supported by any
study. 176
In the context of the Ninth Circuit these arguments become even more
problematic. California is one of the most populous states, and is easily the
largest source of cases in the Ninth Circuit. One Ninth Circuit judge has noted
that due to California's massive population, "any circuit that serves California
171 Howard Mintz, Appeals Court Faces Split: Republicans Pushing to Divide 9th Circuit,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 7, 2005 at Al (indicating that one proposed House Bill
"would add more than 60 federal judges nationwide, including seven to a newly formed 9th
Circuit").
172 Roll, supra note 169, at 36.
173 See Final Report, supra note 165, at 29.
174 Roll, supra note 169, at 36.
175 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515 (1928) ("A powerful judiciary implies a relatively
small number of judges.").
176 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 27, at 301 ("Opponents of additional judgeships
make this argument confidently, as though its factual premises were beyond dispute. In fact,
however, there is no empirical evidence that additional judgeships will reduce prestige or
that reduced prestige will diminish the pool of judicial candidates.").
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will have to be too big."' 177 California's needs have become so great that some
Ninth Circuit judges based outside of the state must travel to California so
frequently they rarely hear matters within the state in which they are actually
based.178 Thus, increasing the number of judges within California alone would
drastically reduce travel for judges based outside of California. This reduced
travel would not only reduce travel related expenses, but would also leave those
judges with more time to prepare written opinions. Adding more judgeships,
although unpopular, must be done. As appellate dockets continue to increase at
alarming rates, it is unrealistic to assume judges can decide these additional
cases without increasing the size of the courts.
C. Limit Appeals as of Right
Another potential solution to the Ninth Circuit's overloaded docket would
be to give the court more control over which cases it takes. As it stands now,
the appeals courts have little power to control the size of their dockets. This
lack of discretionary control over which cases the circuits hear leaves the courts
open to potentially limitless docket sizes. Because these courts have no discre-
tionary control over their dockets, they are forced to hear an ever-inflating
number of meritless appeals. 179 Since judicial resources have not kept up with
this docket inflation, litigants before the appeals courts face great delays in
having their matters resolved. However, this is not the first time in American
history a federal appellate court has faced such a problem. In the late 1800's
the United States Supreme Court became increasingly overwhelmed by the
sheer increase in the number and growing array and complexity of cases
filed.' 8 ° Because the Court could not keep up with this unprecedented growth,
litigants found that they faced a more than three-year wait before receiving a
decision on their issues.1 8'
It was within this context that Congress, through the Evarts Act of 1891,
first introduced the concept of making the Supreme Court's review discretion-
ary.' 82 Although the primary goal of the Act was to create nationwide uni-
formity of law,' 8 3 the inclusion of discretionary review also successfully
limited the size of the Supreme Court's docket. In fact, the Act was so success-
ful that it cut Supreme Court's docket from 623 cases docketed in 1890, to just
177 Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Administrative Oversight
and the Courts Committee (Oct. 26, 2005) available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id= 1635&witjid=4730.
178 Judge Richard Tallman, Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Administrative Oversight
and the Courts Committee (Oct. 26, 2005) (indicating that he "heard cases at [his] home base
of Seattle for only one week of the entire year.") available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id= 1635&wit id=4727.
171 Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 218 (2001).
180 Margaret M. Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurispruden-
tial Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 392 (2004).
181 Id.
182 Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
181 Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24
CARDozo L. REV. 1753, 1827 (2003).
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275 by 1892.184 Despite this decrease in docket size the Court still remained
overwhelmed. In February of 1925 Congress acted again to limit appeals as of
right, thus giving the Supreme Court even more control over its docket.18 5 The
docket control granted in the 1925 Act, known as the Judges' Bill,' 8 6 has con-
tinually expanded to its current state. At present, the Supreme Court's ability
to set its docket is almost without limitation, leaving the Court able to hear as
many or as few cases as the Justices want.'8 7 In fact, the Supreme Court
receives over 7000 petitions for writ of certiorari each year,' 8 8 yet its docket
ranges only from 76 to 92 cases per year.'8 9
Theoretically, as it stands now the Court has the "freedom to hear just a
handful of cases in a single area of the law each term or it could hear hundreds,
perhaps even thousands, across the legal spectrum."' 90 Despite this extraordi-
nary power, the Court has not limited its review to only cases it finds interest-
ing. "' Instead the Supreme Court uses the "Rule of Four," which requires at
least four Justices vote to hear the case. 192 The Justices of the Court have long
recognized that this power to decide which cases it will hear is important, but
"[d]eciding not to decide is ... among the most important things done by the
Supreme Court." '19 3 This is due not only to the fact that the issue may not be
ready to be heard, but also because the Court must keep its docket within con-
trollable limits. The Supreme Court is not the only court to follow the idea of
discretionary appellate review. Rather, some states have also limited appeals as
of right, including those to the first appellate level.' 94
Some scholars have criticized the use of discretionary review as, among
other things, lacking public accountability.195 Even some members of the
Court itself have acknowledged this deficiency. Justice Jackson once stated,
"neither those outside of the Court, nor on many occasions those inside of it,
know just what reasons led six Justices to withhold consent to a certiorari."'1 96
Despite this criticism, discretionary review has been a hallmark of the Ameri-
can appellate review system.
184 Id.
185 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1643-44 (2000) (arguing that this was the first
step towards the Supreme Court legitimately removing itself from the "Senate's shadows").
186 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 180, at 392.
187 Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons From the
Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 889, 889 (2004).
188 See The Justices' Caseload, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf
(last visited Aug. 25 2006).
189 Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra L. Bassett, The End of Law, 84 BU. L. REv. 1, 49 (2004).
190 Staudt, supra note 187, at 889.
191 Id.
192 Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 189, at 49-50.
193 THURGOOD MARSHALL, Address at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 8,
1978), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND
REMINISCENCES 174, 177 (Mark V. Tushnet ed. 2001).
194 See, e.g., PAUL M. SANDLER & ANDREW D. LEVY, APPELLATE PRACrICE FOR THE MARY-
LAND LAWYER: STATE AND FEDERAL 25 (2d ed. 2001) (indicating that less than half of
Maryland Court of Appeals docket consists of non-discretionary cases.).
195 Cordray & Cordray, supra note 180, at 452.
196 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Limiting appeals as of right so the circuit courts have more discretion in
which cases they take would significantly reduce their current caseload. The
courts would be able to deny review to cases which only raise previously set-
tled issues, thus greatly reducing the number of redundant appeals. Because the
redundancy of appeals is one of the reasons given to justify the use of unpub-
lished opinions, 97 this solution would help the circuit courts efficiently man-
age their caseloads following Rule 32.1's effective date. As with the Supreme
Court, giving the circuit courts more discretion would allow them to reduce
both their caseloads and the number of inconsistent or conflicting decisions.
It is unlikely Congress would give the circuit courts the same type of com-
plete discretion the Supreme Court exercises. Thus, one potential difficulty
with this solution would be determining which appeals will be limited. One
such matter to consider would be diversity jurisdiction. Both jurists and schol-
ars alike have already called for an abolition of diversity jurisdiction in the
district courts,' 98 which, if Congress took such action, would eliminate appeals
arising therefrom. However, this would likely be ineffective as the total num-
ber of appeals filed in 2005 arising from diversity jurisdiction cases in all cir-
cuits only amounted to 2,975 cases, which is roughly 4.5% of the 65,418 total
cases filed during that year.' 99
Two more effective areas in which appeals as of fight could be limited are
the areas of administrative appeals and prisoner petitions. The total number of
administrative appeals filed in all circuits in the year 2005 came to 12,808,20 0
while the total number of prisoner petitions came to 16,588,201 approximately
19.6% and 25.4% of all cases filed that year respectively. These two areas are
also suitable for limitation given the low frequency with which the appeals
courts reverse the decision of the court below: 6.1% and 9.4% respectively. 0 2
Therefore, if Congress is unwilling to grant the circuit courts complete discre-
tionary control over their dockets, limiting appeals as of right in these two areas
alone would greatly reduce the circuit courts' dockets.
Another potential difficulty with this solution would be developing the
procedure the circuits would use in deciding which cases to hear. Due to their
size, it would be hard for circuits like the Ninth to use a procedure such as the
Supreme Court's Rule of Four. Requiring every judge on the circuit, or more
likely their law clerks, to read petitions for review would diminish any time
actually saved by refusing to review the case. Therefore, it would be more
beneficial for the circuits to each devise a system which best fits that particular
circuit. For example, larger circuits such as the Ninth could create specialized
panels which are assigned the task of reviewing petitions for review. Since
these screening panels would not be required to right write lengthy opinions,
197 See supra Section Part II.A.I.
"I See Warren E. Berger, Address to the American Law Institute (May 20-23, 1975), in 52
A.L.I. PROC. 29, 37-38 (1975); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:
Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966 (1979).
199 See Caseload Statistics, supra note 21, at 32 tbl.B-7, http://www.uscourts.gov/
caseload2005/tables/B07mar05.pdf.
200 Id. at 22 tbl.B-1.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 26 tbl. B-5.
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but rather short statements granting or denying review, they would be able to
review large quantities of petitions for review. Further, the panel members
would gain specialized knowledge in the areas they review, which would create
more consistency in the circuit's case law on the subject. Smaller circuits, on
the other hand, could implement systems whereby each judge within the circuit
reviews a certain percentage of the petitions for review, thereby spreading the
screening responsibility equally. These are only a few examples, and as dis-
cussed above, each circuit should be permitted to devise the system which best
fits the particular circuit. However, whatever system the circuit develops, giv-
ing the circuits more discretionary control would greatly reduce the size of their
dockets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit, faced with an overwhelming caseload, has resorted to
the use of unpublished opinions to keep up. By using unpublished opinions the
judges are able to quickly dispose of redundant issues in short periods of time,
and can often delegate this responsibility to law clerks. This saved time allows
the judges to handle a larger number of cases without creating an unmanage-
able backlog. However, because these unpublished opinions are often the work
of non-judges, and use vague wording, many circuits, including the Ninth, have
adopted rules which prohibit litigants or other courts from citing to those opin-
ions. Use of these limited citation rules has been greatly criticized by some
judges and scholars.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 will prohibit limited citation
rules such as the one used by the Ninth Circuit. Although the rule does not tell
the circuit courts what precedential value must be given to the unpublished
opinions, the Committee Note suggests, at a minimum, they will constitute per-
suasive value. Rule 32.1 is intended to create uniformity between each circuit
but will instead create several unintended consequences. First, because Rule
32.1 does not state what precedential value should be given to each unpub-
lished opinion, there is an inherent problem risk that subsequent appeals and
trial courts will give them too much weight. Because subsequent panels within
the same circuit are generally bound by the prior panel rule, they will feel
pressured to give the unpublished opinion binding authority.
The second potential consequence is that judges who face having their
unpublished opinions being treated as binding precedent will feel bound to
spend more time ensuring the dispositions use exact language. This increase in
time spent on unpublished opinions, without a simultaneous decrease in
caseload size, will result in a decrease in time spent preparing published opin-
ions, thus decreasing their quality, or resulting in greater delays for litigants.
Judges may attempt to increase their productivity by issuing one-word or one-
line dispositions, which fail to inform the parties of the reasoning behind the
court's decision.
A third potential consequence is that Rule 32.1 will create inconsistency
between federal and state procedure for attorneys practicing within the Ninth
Circuit. Although inconsistency between circuit courts was one reason given in
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support of Rule 32.1, this inconsistency between federal and state courts will be
more frequently encountered.
The Ninth Circuit must find methods for dealing with these consequences.
One potential solution would be to split the Ninth Circuit into smaller circuits,
thus reducing the number of potential three-judge panels and the number of
cases issued by the circuit. This would allow each judge to keep better abreast
of the decisions by other panels within the circuit, which in turn would reduce
the number of inconsistent and conflicting opinions.
Another solution, albeit controversial, would be to simply add more judge-
ships to the Ninth Circuit. Although this would make the largest circuit larger,
given the increase in the number of cases filed in the Ninth Circuit each year, it
is unrealistic to think the current court size can keep up, and adding judgeships
to would make up for the lost time resulting from Rule 32.1 .that Rule 32.1 will
cost.
Another potential solution would be to limit appeals as of right to the
appeals courts. Historically the Supreme Court uses its discretionary review
power as a mechanism for docket control. If Congress were to extend this
power to the Ninth Circuit and other appeals courts they, too, would be able to
vastly reduce the size of their dockets by not hearing appeals which raise
already decided points of law.
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